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TRUST AND ABUSABILITY TOOLKIT
Centering Safety in Human-Data Interactions
If you care about security, you care about safety. So you need to care about abusability and trust. This toolkit will 
provide information about why centering peoples’ safety in our digital technologies is important. We present the 
concepts of abusability and trust as two important tenets of building such safer technologies, followed by resources 
that can help us build safer technologies. 
How and why we trust in technologies can have many different meanings depending on the context. For example, 
we can understand trust to be a static object (eg. when a trusted user is given access to a system), but we can also 
understand trusting as an action (which is impermanent and can waver in time) and being trustworthy as a quality 
to aspire to. Despite this complexity, when it comes to designing new technologies, we often only consider trust as 
a shorthand for user engagement - if we increase trust in a system, more people will use it. We argue that when we 
center peoples’ safety instead of engagement, trust has to become a more complicated part of the development 
process. Instead we provie three questions that can help designers and developers more deeply engage with the 
topic of ‘trust’ and how it can help us build safer systems: (1) Is trust being used as a verb or a noun? (2) Who, 
where, and why do we Trust? And (3) how do we Trust?  
Abusability is the possibility that malicious actors might weaponise a system for harmful activity; designers have 
a responsibility to anticipate and mitigate this. Abusability plays on the concept of “usability” to ask what kinds 
of uses should be restricted rather than enabled in design. This form of threat assessment and testing reframes 
security’s traditional focus on an external attacker penetrating or subverting a system from its intended or 
authorised purpose, to ask how people use features for harm. Developers and designers should consider abusability 
at various stages of the design lifecycle: asking how might a product be abused during threat modelling and 
testing, and then making sure there are robust mechanisms for responding to abuse, such as reporting features 
and support for rectification. This allows companies to respond to problems on their devices and platforms as 
they arise. Mature company practices in this space will move beyond tokenistic inclusion and meaningfully involve 
survivors and advocates in designing both preventative measures and responses to abuse.
A summary of the resources available at the end of the toolkit
Implications for advocates and others who support survivors outlines key recommendations for supporting 
survivors of technology-mediated abuse and for engaging with technology companies to improve their services
Designing for Survivors and Perpetrators outlines advice for technology companies and researchers wanting to 
implement features that better support survivors of technology-mediated abuse and proactively engaging with 
perpetrators of such harm
Abusability and the secure systems development life cycle provides an outline for a development life cycle 
that takes peoples’ safety into consideration
We provide three Case Studies that can be used to explore, learn, facilitate training, or help people engage with 
the topic of safety when designing new technologies
Taking Abusability Seriously provides technology companies and services a self-evaluation tool of how mature 
their features are in relation to the safety
Do’s and don’ts for journalists covering technology-mediated abuse provides guidance and advice for 
journalists who write about topics related to technology-mediated abuse
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Key take-aways for technology workers and companies
You cannot ‘design out’ harm and abuse, but you can reduce the likelihood it will happen and mitigate its 
effects through responsive company processes
Abusability is something you have to consider throughout the design and deployment processes, and 
should be negotiated with people who use the system after it has been deployed
Trust is dynamic, and technologies can encourage us to examine new questions about ourselves and our 
connections with others; and we should have the confidence to ask questions of such devices.
Focusing more on the process of designing new systems or features (rather than being entirely outcome-
driven) can help us be more careful about what we design and the potential negative consequences it can 
have
Key take-aways for advocates, support workers, and survivors
Your expertise is invaluable and should be included in the entire design cycle of a project
Be wary of ‘safety washing’ where companies involve you only at the end of a project to get ‘approval’ 
and be able to write that they worked with advocates / survivors 
Key take-aways for academics, researchers, and facilitators of learning
When thinking about human-data interaction, it is important to consider how power plays into the 
conversation, what the wider eco-system in which the interaction sits includes, and to be more process- 
rather than outcome-oriented in our work
This toolkit is a resource for students and facilitators of learning for computer scientists, designers, 
software developers, machine learning training, etc. Please make use of it as such.  
Feminist ways of working can influence not only waht we do, but also how we approach the topic/issue/
problem. It is important to change what we see as ‘security’ and ‘safety’ concerns in technology research, 
and how we are able to deal with these issues holistically rather than attempting to design individual 
systems or features that aim to end this complex, societal problem. 
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Human-Data Interaction (HDI) is a framework that presents three tenets that help designers make more ethical data-intensive 
systems. Data intensive systems are digital infrastructures and systems that use, curate, or analyse data that is produced by 
and about us as people. HDI tries to make sure that this data (1) is legible (which means we have access to it in a format that 
we are able to understand). (2) HDI also postulates that we should have agency over how data is collected and used about us; 
and (3) that we should be able to change how this data is used by negotiating with those who receive data about us. 
Trust
Trust has many different meanings in different contexts, but for simplicity we use the definition proposed by  Marsh and 
Dibben (2003): trust includes a positive expectation (that something will happen) regarding someone or something’s 
behaviour in a situation that involves risk. This can mean looking beyond what feels trustworthy subjectively and onto 
analysing larger group behaviours such as what it means to trust in software companies in resolving challenges due to 
malicious or absent-minded intentions. Trust is especially important in cases of abuse and violence as abuse is not only a 
misuse of the positive benefits accrued from being in a position of trust, but is an integral part of trust itself. 
Technology-mediated abuse
This can sometimes be referred to as technology-facilitated abuse or ‘tech abuse’, but includes any deliberate use of digital 
technologies or systems to scare, harass, coerce or stalk someone. Examples include intimate image abuse (sometimes known 
as ‘revenge porn’), using location-data for stalking, or remotely controlling Internet of Things (IoT) devices for ‘gaslighting’, 
i.e. making someone doubt their own sanity. It is a form of controlling behaviour as its intention is to control or influence the 
behaviours of the person(s) who are being targeted. It can result in someone feeling helpless, isolated, and confused due to 
the pervasive and ubiquitous nature that technology plays in modern life. Like all forms of abuse, technology-enabled abuse 
disproportionately affects those whose identities are marginalised due to societal structures of oppression such as racism, 
misogyny, class privilege, ableism, heterosexism. 
Violence, Harm and Abuse
By violence we mean the intentional use of power, threatened or actualised, against yourself, another person, or a group that 
results in injury, harm, maldevelopment or deprivation. This is similar, but not identical to a more commonly used term of 
abuse that can be defined as using something for a bad effect or purpose and treating someone with cruelty or violence. As 
many people only associate ‘violence’ with physical harm, many prefer the term ‘abuse’ though you may also see this language 
being used interchangeably. The final term that this toolkit covers is harm, which is the damage caused to someone caused by 
a particular course of action. As we can see each of these terms builds on or directly includes the other, and we can roughly 
map them out as so:
Data-Intensive System
Throughout the toolkit, we refer to devices that collect, produce, or analyse these kinds of data that we produce as ‘data-
intensive systems’. These may be algorithms or smart home devices that rely on algorithms and machine learning to do their 
computations - for example a smart speaker or a smart watch. Data-intensive systems however not only refer to objects 
or ‘things’ that we can see, but also relate to software systems. For example, in the UK a data-intensive system was used to 
calculate A-level results in 2020 to great uproar from students, teachers, and parents alike. 
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Introduction
As people who use smartphones, computers, or other smart devices, we interact with and produce data on a daily 
basis. This data is then used by companies, work places, or organisations for a variety of different goals. In this 
toolkit we present pragmatic opportunities for developers, designers, and third sector organisations on how we can 
interact with these kinds of data-intensive systems in ways that center peoples’ safety. We do this by first presenting 
the Human-Data Interaction Framework as a useful set of guiding principles for ethical engagement with humans 
and data, before we extend the existing framework with pragmatic approaches to how we can more directly 
integrate notions of ‘abusability’ and ‘trust’ into the design, deployment, and use of such systems. At the end, we 
also present a number of resources to help implement our ideas. 
By data we mean a record of something that has happened (a heartbeat, a mouseclick) that has to undergo a 
transformation through analysis or observation into information. The buzzwords ‘data-driven’ and ‘data-informed’ 
policy and approaches have become commonplace but there has been little confirmation as to what these actually 
mean for different groups and contexts. In doing so, this brings about major opportunities for the design of 
different processes and systems that have the potential to enhance our lives.  Information can be used to learn 
new insights about people, places, and important concepts. Whenever we get a change of state, from data to 
information, we can ask the following questions: What is chosen to be useful to collect information on? Who is 
included or excluded in this transformation of data to information? What aims do we hope to reach through having 
such information? What information is lost in the process of analysis? Asking these questions and responding to 
them has the ability to expose injustices, particularly for individuals who do not have the ability to ask these of data-
intensive systems and the people or companies who make them.
All of these questions mirror some interesting conversations around the distribution of social power across 
different social groups and identities. Social movements such as #MeToo and BlackLivesMatter make evident, 
among other things, the power imbalance in crucial social systems upon which we depend, such as employment 
and right to justice. Feminist thinking and theories give us language to critically analyse these power imbalances, 
particularly looking towards how women and other marginalised groups may not hold power over important 
decisions that affect their lives (Hendricks & Oliver, 1999). Because of this, it is essential to scrutinise frameworks 
that help us develop more ethical structures for how humans interact with and through data and data-intensive 
systems. With the move towards decision-making systems based on so-called Big Data, there has never been a 
better time for a call for critical action and analysis.  
There is often a huge gap between developers of such systems who want to work ethicallyu, and the tools needed 
to be able to put this willingness for ethical conduct into practice. While there are many frameworks for ‘ethical 
design’ or ‘ethical data’ practices, many of these are very conceptual. This means they do not necessarily provide 
computer and data workers with pragmatic guidance on how to put the well-meaning conceptual ethics frameworks 
into practice. 
The Human-Data Interaction (HDI) Framework was developed in 2016 by a group of researchers working across 
a variety of fields to fill this gap and to help computer and data workers engage pragmatically with ethical design 
practices around data-intensive systems and the services they provide. When thinking about ‘systems’ we are 
referring mostly to computer systems (both the hardware and software that are needed for it to function), but 
9
depending on our projects, this may also relate to wider systems of who is using these 
computers, in what settings, and for what purposes. So for example, in an office you may be 
using a laptop with a variety of software systems installed. These systems may be related to 
different forms of data that your workplace collects, analyses, and uses in spreadsheets or 
text documents. In this case, it is important also to think about the setting you are in when 
using the laptop computer - your access to certain kinds of data probably depend on what 
department you are in in your company, and where you are on the corporate hierarchy. 
These different kinds of ‘context’ are important to consider, because our definitions of 
‘system’ really depend on the scope and frame of our analysis. This is also the case when 
we think about the HDI framework, though for the most part, we refer to data-intensive 
software systems that predominantly deal with personal data. This relates for example to 
algorithms or smart devices, and how they compute and use data that is collected about us 
as individual people. 
When designing such data-intensive systems, designers and developers always have to 
make decisions about what kinds of data to collect and analyse, how to represent them, 
and how to reduce and abstract them for the systems to work. It is not a question about 
whether reductionism or abstraction take place in systems, but rather about how and 
why that takes place. Computer systems are media like many others, where designers are 
able to emphasise, aggregate, or ignore different kinds of information; they make choices 
about how and what to abstract or reduce - it is not possible to not do this. As researchers 
who have come before us have said (Chalmers, 2004a, 2004b), it is not possible to take 
everything into consideration all of the time. 
The HDI framework provides us some starting points to think about this issue in more detail. 
It provides us some steps towards building better systems that are more ethical in their 
use and computation of data. We hope that throughout this toolkit you will learn about the 
HDI framework and how it can be helpful - we also hope that our critique of this framework 
and its extension will help you be able to better design data-intensive systems that take 
into consideration peoples safety. For clarity, we, as authors of this toolkit, did not create 
the HDI framework - we were funded by the EPSRC Network+ on Human-Data Interaction 
(which is a group of academics, some of whom were part of the team who coined the term 
and developed the framework) to explore, critique, and extend the existing HDI framework 
to center peoples’ safety. 
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The work presented in the toolkit took place in the Spring and Summer of 2021, using a variety of methods in 
a feminist framing of safety and digitally-mediated abuse of data-intensive systems. Here, we first outline the 
methods we used for our work individually before we address their convergence in the development of this toolkit. 
Research workshops with experts:
Julia Slupska and Angelika Strohmayer, with 
support from Tara Hairston, Gina Neff, and 
Adam Dodge, worked to critique and extend 
the existing Human-Data Interaction (HDI) 
framework. We facilitated two workshops:
1. A workshop with 11 international expert 
practitioners who work on topics related 
to safety, data, and technologies. This 
included third sector organisations 
who support victim survivors, security 
and technology practitioners, as well as 
lawyers and human rights advocates.
2. A workshop with 9 international expert 
researchers who work on topics related 
to technology-mediated abuse, security, 
other forms of violence related to 
technologies, and data justice. This 
included academics at various career 
stages as well as researchers from 
industry.
These workshops were audio recorded and transcribed. The transcripts were then analysed using Reflexive 
Thematic Analysis (Braun and Clarke, 2020) through a feminist lense - an approach that provides a reflection of 
qualitative research as “creative, reflexive and subjective, with researcher subjectivity understood as a resource 
(see Gough and Madill 2012), rather than a potential threat to knowledge production.” (Braun and Clarke, 2019).  
We followed Braun and Clarke’s (2006) 6 phases of doing a Thematic Analysis: (1) data familiarization, (2) 




At the same time as the thematic analysis, and after initial coding of the workshop transcripts 
and multiple group reflections on initial findings, Julia Slupska carried out a literature review 
to collate articles that relate to feminist methods for the development of databases and data-
intensive systems, focusing on project processes and narratives of power, and the concept of 
abusability. Ultimately this analysis brings together both empirical and theoretical research to 
explore the relationship between these disparate areas of study. She did this to find out how 
design processes, power structures, and abusability relate to the development of computer 
systems. This process was also framed by Slupska’s previous research with advocates of 
victim survivors, as well as the literature that was shared during the workshop with expert 
researchers on related topics. Strohmayer wrote up Slupska’s initial analysis. 
Literature Review on Abusability:
Rosanna Bellini, under supervision from Angelika Strohmayer and Lynne Coventry, carried 
out a rapid evidence review by following and adapting the 26 recommendations for such 
processes by the Cochrane Research Group (Garritty et al, 2021). This review explored how 
‘abuse’ and ‘trust’ are depicted and framed by Human-Computer Interaction (HCI) and 
other related technology literatures. This approach to the literature review allowed her to 
do a comprehensive review of the literature, while also giving her space to explore broad 
and interdisciplinary articles. The analysis was done not only to critique current discussions, 
but also to reflect on how the work of the academic community is embedded in wider 
conversations around violence. Rosanna selected, parsed, and analysed 110 articles for the 
review, developing a dynamic and relational framework to help us better understand what 
‘trust’ means in relation to technologies and abuse.
Narrative Literature Review on trust, violence, and technologies:
Following a series of interviews with advocates who support survivors of technology-mediated 
abuse, a workshop with additional advocates, and the production of a literature review 
on abusability, Julia Slupska developed a series of case studies to illustrate what we mean 
with ‘abusability’ and ‘trust’ in our extension of the HDI framework. This was carried out in 
conversation with Angelika Strohmayer, and brings together examples from the empirical 
research with advocates as well as examples from industry. The case studies were produced to 
illustrate the complexity of the real world, and how abusability and trust can help us develop 
tactics and technologies to improve safety for people interacting with data-intensive systems.
Producing Case Studies:
This toolkit brings together all the research  processes described above. We of course also 
draw on past research and work experience from the authors, giving us space to situate and 
contextualise our analyses (Braun and Clarke, 2020). As such, the resources shared at the end 
of the toolkit were created based on the research methods we outline above, but also stem 
from knowledge produced in a variety of other research projects carried out by the authors 
over the last years. 
Creating the toolkit :
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The toolkit is laid out in three parts: (1) an introduction to the Human-Data 
Interaction (HDI) framework; (2) a feminist critique and extension of the 
existing HDI framework that provides insight into how we can better center 
peoples’ safety in data-intensive systems; and (3) a collection of resources 
that can be used by technology designers, advocates for victim-survivors, 
educators, journalists, and others in this area of work to develop better 
technologies and systems that place peoples’ safety at the heart of their 
work. 
Throughout the toolkit, we present critiques of current approaches related to the 
‘ethical’ use of data while also producing new and powerful insights that can help us 
build better systems and technologies in the future. We do this by focusing our critique 
on processes rather than outcomes, giving space to critically examine and explore 
alternative ways in which we can engage people and threats in product design cycles. 
We also look at how these technical systems and their design processes can help shape 
societal change (looking towards social education, funding landscapes, and policy 
discourse) to tackle the root causes of digitally-mediated abuse and violence. 
OVERVIEW OF THE TOOLKIT
13
Part 1:
WHAT IS THE HUMAN-DATA INTERACTION FRAMEWORK?
In 2016, Richard Mortier, Hamed Haddadi, Tristan Henderson, Derek MCAuley, Jon 
Crowcroft and Andy Crabtree wrote about Human-Data Interaction for the Encyclopedia 
of Human-Computer Interaction. In this article, they wrote: “We think that it’s crucial to 
understand 1) how our behaviours, 2) how the data our behaviours generate, and 3) how the 
algorithms which process these data increasingly shape our lives. Human-Data Interaction 
(HDI) places the human at the centre of these data flows, and HDI provides mechanisms 
which can help the individual and groups of people to interact explicitly with these systems 
and data.” 
However, this is not the first or only definition of this framework. For example, publications 
from 2013, 2014, and 2020 produce a number of slightly different definitions. However, we 
use the definition presented on the HDI NEtwork+ website (https://hdi-network.org/) that 
outlines pragmatic guidance for the data-intensive systems development process: legibility, 
agency, and negotiability.
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Legibility refers to the understanding that data is not 
only presented in a transparent way, but that the way it 
is presented is understandable to people. This means it is 
not only possible to look up what data is being collected, 
analysed, or used about people in a certain system, but 
that people are also able to understand what it is they are 
looking at. This requires a certain degree of curation or 
simplification from the system developers/owners.
Legibility
Agency refers to the ability for people to have the capacity 
to interact with the system in which data about them is 
being collected, produced, or used. In short, people should 
have agency over what data is collected and stored about 
them, how it is used, and what happens with it. 
Agency
Negotiability refers to the ability for people to not only 
have agency over what happens with their data, but that 
they are able to negotiate this use with those who run 
the system they are using. If people feel like their data is 
being mishandled or misused in some way, they should 
have the ability to engage in a conversation with the 
system developers/owners to adapt the use of their data. 
Negotiability
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As part of the Network’s work, they extended the framework, adding the concepts of 
‘Surveillance/Resistance’. While not formally added yet, this recent addition provides 
further thinking of how people can interact with data and data-intensive systems - a way of 
resisting use of data that is perhaps legal but not seen as ‘ethical’ by the people about whom 
data is being collected. This is a concept that should be used when the first three concepts 
(legibility, agency, and negotiability) are already applied, but we still believe our data is being 
mishandled (even if legally so). While there are many examples of ‘defensive’ approaches to 
resisting the use of personal data by corporations or governments, there are few examples 
of techniques that make the perceived misuse of data visible through the use of the system 
(eg. by increasing noise in datasets or adding false data as activism). These are the kinds of 
‘resistance’ that Chalmers and his colleagues refer to. 
To build on this thinking, to develop more pragmatic principles, and to share examples of how 
this way of thinking could look in practice, Matthew Chalmers and his colleagues developed 
the Human-Data Interaction Network+ in 2018. Chalmers and his colleagues understood 
that there was a conceptual gap between software development work and wanting to do the 
‘right thing’ pragmatically to ensure peoples’ data is used ethically. They appreciated that it is 
important to think about not only the direct software development, but also to think about 
the contexts in which and with which these developers work. For example, what code and data 
libraries are being used, who are the people developing these data-intensive systems, or what 
are the corporate and time pressures under which people have to work.
Essentially, when taking these four concepts together, we 
should have certain kinds of control over data-intensive 
systems that collect, use, analyse, or share our data. We should 
be able to understand what is collected about us and how this 
is used (legibility), we should be able to make decisions about 
what data is collected and how it is used (agency), we should 
be able to raise concerns about perceived misuse of data with 
the ability to make changes to the system (negotiability), and 
we should have ways of resisting to legal but morally dubious 
ways of using our data (surveillance/resistance). 
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WHY IS THE HDI FRAMEWORK NOT 
ENOUGH TO ENSURE PEOPLE ARE SAFE?
Despite its potential, the HDI framework is not enough for us to be able to pragmatically 
provide ethical and safe technologies. We go into details of this in Part 2 of this toolkit, but 
want to present a brief overview here as well. Taking a feminist lense to HDI, we can quickly 
see that the framework is not complete. It lacks a deep engagement with power structures, 
how our individual personal data relates to the personal data of others, and how all of these 
concepts have implications for people’s safety, especially those that exist at the margins. 
To illustrate what we mean, we now take a closer look at the framework’s concept of 
‘agency’. While it is important to give people the capacity to interact with systems and to 
control and correct data-driven processes, not all uses of agency over data are beneficial. 
Malicious uses of this agency can contribute to controlling behaviours in interpersonal 
relationships, for example as is shown by Leitão’s (2019) work anticipating the abuse of  IoT 
devices with domestic violence survivors. There is also not enough critical discussion in the 
HDI framework, and elsewhere, of when and how agency could and should be limited or 
constrained. 
To carry out our feminist critique, we center experiences and needs of those people who 
are experiencing different forms of oppressions from systems, society, or legal frameworks 
and as such have unique ways of interacting with data and data-driven systems. In traditional 
security research, these are often referred to as ‘edge cases’. These ‘edge cases’ however 
make up huge swathes of the population. To name only a few examples, social media 
algorithms shadowban activists which can result in harming movements towards more 
socially just worlds (Blunt et al., 2020), and we know that data-intensive systems have 
deeply ingrained gendered and racialised biases (Eubanks, 2018; Noble, 2018; Costanza-
Chock, 2019). Data-intensive technologies are also being used as part of other forms of 
violence and coercive control such as stalking, and in domestic violence aggressions (Freed 
et al., 2017, 2018, 2019; Woodlock, 2017; Tseng et al, 2020; Bellini et al, 2021). Experiences 
of digitally mediated violence, such as algorithmic bias or shadow banning, become even 
more commonplace when people experience multiple, intersecting, and complex forms of 
oppression (Blunt et al., 2020; Crenshaw, 1989). 
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A UNIDIR report (2021) on gender-based cybersecurity explored issues of design, 
defence, and response to violence perpetrated through digital means has noted that 
criminal justice responses are currently not adequate in protecting victim-survivors and 
holding perpetrators to account. Normative language in security discourse often relates 
to victim blaming (eg. “they didn’t do enough to protect themselves”) and results in the 
individualisation of the problem and responsibility (eg. “these are individual incidences of 
violence”). Feminist approaches to security emphasize that social relations are a source for 
both security and insecurity, or a “key connective tissue through which different dimensions 
of (in)security are entangled” (Hörschelmann and Reich 2017). 
Furthermore, feminist research from criminology and sociology about experiences of 
domestic violence highlights that violence is always experienced as part of an ecology which 
is mediated through different forms of violence (verbal, physical, etc.) as well as coercion 
and control. In recent years, this has also developed into a conversation about digitally-
mediated violence (Leitão, 2019; Tseng et al, 2020; Bellini et al., 2021). Understanding our 
world as post-digital (Coles-Kemp et al, 2020) means that we know that people’s safety 
is impacted when interacting with data, databases, and data-intensive systems; and that 
this can impact aspects of both our digital and non-digital selves. We also know that any 
violence we experience based on this has real, material impacts on our physical, mental, 
and emotional health. Additionally, seeing safety as central to our post-digital worlds, 
and seeing this safety as part of the ecologies in which we interact with data, means that 
we see the impacts of data-driven and data-mediated violence on individuals as well as 
people around them: their children (Millar et al., 2021) or the communities they represent, 
through increased racism (Jankowicz et al., 2021), for example. Ultimately, seeing the issue 
as an ecology of violence allows us to understand that these incidents are never a singular 
anomaly of use of the data or data-intensive system, and that it is never just one person that 
this kind of abuse is being perpetrated against. 
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As part of this toolkit, we present two potential extensions to the HDI framework - concepts 
that will help developers and owners of data-intensive systems think more critically about 
peoples’ safety. Our intention is that through this, technologists will be able to develop 
better (and safer) technologies for all, but especially for those who exist at the margins. 
Having said this, we want to very strongly refute the thought that if only we are able to 
design the right kind of technology or the right kind of feature in our data-intensive systems 
that we are able to make people entirely safe. Rather, we would argue that this technology-
centred approach to the abuse of data and data-intensive systems to perpetrate violence 
against individuals is in itself harmful. What if we imagined a world where money was 
spent on support services for survivors of violence or behaviour change programmes for 
perpetrators instead of unused digital safety gadgets?  Imagine the world we could create 
if we tackled the issue of abuse and misuse of data-intensive systems at their root; 
if instead of tackling mis-use of one specific system, we instead tackled issues of 
patriarchy and of violence at all levels of our societies? 
While we do not see technologies as solutions to abuse, violence, and other societal 
problems, technologies are indeed useful tools in the wider systems in which we exist. 
Technologies mediate so many aspects of our lives, that it seems almost inevitable that 
they also mediate abuse as well - this is an aspect that should be accounted for in design 
processes, rather than being ignored. Because of this, it is not possible to ‘design out’ 
the abuse of technologies, or the use of technologies to harm others. However, it 
is possibly to build systems which are safer and less prone to abuse. We present some 
reflections on existing data-intensive systems as well as what we can learn from their (mis)
use below. 
USING OR RE-DESIGNING TECHNOLOGIES 
TO END INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE
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Part 2:
FEMINIST CRITIQUE AND EXTENSION OF THE 
HUMAN-DATA INTERACTION FRAMEWORK
Part 2 of this toolkit relates directly to the research carried out about the Human-Data 
Interaction framework. First, we present a short overview of academic literature that 
sits at the intersection of technologies and harm. Then, Strohmayer writes about how 
researchers and practitioners have critiqued the framework through a feminist lense. After 
this extended critique, Slupska and Bellini expand the framework, adding two important 
concepts that developers of data-intensive systems should take into consideration: 
abusability and trust, respectively. Following these additions, Slupska presents a series of 
case studies that represent both positive and negative examples of when developers and 
users of data-intensive systems have engaged with notions of abusability and trust. 
Many researchers have studied the relationships between technologies and harms. Here, we 
want to give a very brief overview of this work, following a review of the literature. We split 
this overview into two subsections: (1) empirical research about technologies and abuse; 
and (2) theories that are used to explore this research area.
AN OVERVIEW OF THE ACADEMIC LITERATURE
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Empirical research to study technology-mediated abuse
We found that there was little work about technology-mediated abuse prior to 2018, but 
that this area of research has expanded very quickly afterwards. During this time, there 
seem to be two ‘waves’ of empirical research at the intersection of abuse and technologies: 
wave one relates to empirical work describing the problem and wave two refers to 
the development of solutions to support survivors. While we do talk about somewhat 
chronological ‘waves’ of research, this is not a mutually exclusive distinction between 
empirical studies and prescriptive design work, as many projects have elements of both. 
This review is not all-encompassing and was carried out with the function of developing a 
structured narrative to help us understand the current landscape.
In the first wave, researchers focused on researching the kinds of attacks that perpetrators 
of technology-mediated abuse use (Levy, 2015; Henry and Flynn, 2019; Freed et al, 2018; 
Lopez-Neira et al, 2019, Tseng et al, 2020), survivors’ digital privacy and security needs 
and practices (Matthews et al, 2017; Freed et al, 2018; Dragiewicz et al, 2019; Sambasivan 
et al 2019, Harris and Woodlock, 2019; Suguira and Smith, 2020) and the role of platforms 
in mediating abuse (Dragiewicz at al, 2018).  Looking towards a different way of doing 
research, some researchers have also attempted to numerically quantify frequency of 
abuse experienced across various platforms, both in individual countries (for example, Pew 
Studies in the US) and across the world (Thomas et al 2021).
Of course this academic research also makes use of some incredibly important grey 
literature. This includes, for example, reports from women’s support services (see eg. 
Project Shift, 2017; Glitch, 2020; WESNET, 2020) , survivor support organisations (Suzy 
Lamplugh Trust, 2021) , sex worker organisers (Barwulor et al, 2021; Blunt et al, 2021 
; PLAN International, 2020). This work often provides more timely empirical research 
about experiences of harm and violence, as well as opportunities for the development of 
services to support perpetrators in changing their behaviours. Government reports, such 
as the Australian eSafety Commissioner’s (2020) work on how technology abuse victimises 
children of domestic violence survivors, have also been critical.  Privacy activists like Eva 
Galperin and the Coalition Against Stalkerware have also made significant contributions to 
our understanding of combatting stalkerware in practice (Galperin 2019). This work often 
includes powerful testimonies of survivors, as well as practical and impactful advice on how 
to make changes in services, policy, or legal structures.  
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Following this intensive empirical research to understand practices of perpetrators and 
needs of survivors, researchers in the second wave turned their attention towards finding 
solutions to this problem (Kadri 2020). This includes, for example, Kadri’s (2020) call for 
greater empathy from technologists, police officers, educators and employers as well as the 
development of Technology Abuse Clinics (Havron et al, 2019; Freed et al, 2019). And Zou 
et al (2021) investigate the role of computer security customer support in aiding survivors. 
This empirical work also relates to the development of design recommendations (Levy 
and Schneier 2021 IBM 2020, Chayn) and methods such as threat modelling (Slupska and 
Tanczer 2021), co-design with survivors (Leitao 2019), and usability analysis (Parkin et al 
2019) for the design and development of safer systems and technologies as well as legal and 
policy recommendations (see eg. Citron 2019). There are also examples that have put into 
practice some of these recommendations, such as Arief et al’s (2014) platform for survivors, 
the Tech vs Abuse (https://www.techvsabuse.info/) project, or Unmochon (Sultana et al 
2021). 
There are few exceptions of empirical work that studies the relationship between 
technologies and harms that relates to perpetrators rather than victim-survivors. While it is 
incredibly important to continue to study ways in which we can better support survivors, it 
is also important to study the practices of perpetrators (Tseng et al, 2020, Bellini et al, 2021) 
- and importantly also how their behaviours can be influenced (Bellini et al 2021). 
All together, this empirical work of the last eight years has provided detailed information 
and accounts about the nature of technology-mediated abuse and has provided some 
insights about how to counter these harms with technologies.
22
Researchers have also written more theoretically about the intersection of technologies 
and abuse. These relate to a diversity of diciplines, such as feminist security studies (see eg 
Sjoberg 2018) and feminist technology studies (see eg Wajcman 2007).
The relationship of technologies and safety also relates to, for example, the Glitch Femninism 
manifesto that addresses the ways non-conforming bodies are glitches in technical systems; 
and how our digital lives and our ‘Away From Keyboard’ (AFK) lives are deeply intertwined 
(Russell, 2020). This idea is similar to Coles-Kemp’s idea of living in a post-digital world, and 
that this has specific implications for our safety (Coles Kemp 2020).
These theories give us language and understanding to look at harm and violence perpetrated 
and experienced through technologies as part of wider ecologies of harm. This means that 
we understand it is not possible to entirely design-out harm, as we have already mentioned 
above. But it also means that we have to cast our web wider than the design stage of the 
development of new technologies when thinking about technology-mediated abuse and its 
implications for people. For example, feminist theories make it clear to us that not only are 
outcomes of design processes important, but that the processes in the development and use 
of these systems themselves can be powerful agents of change. 
Furthermore, these approaches give us space to think more deeply about what safety means, 
and who’s safety it is we want to center. All our AFK and virtual experiences are shaped by 
who we are, the different identities we inhabit and present with, and how others perceive our 
identities. For example, we know that black women are more likely to experience abuse online 
than white women, and disabled people experience different kinds of abuse to non-disabled 
folks. While we of course have to design our systems in ways that reduces the opportunities 
of harm, we also have to design ways in which people can report or counter harmful situations 
when they arise - and importantly - that these complaints will be taken seriously and acted 
upon. 
All of this relates to power. The power we have as individual users and in collectives, but also 
the power that Big Tech has over us - the power of data. This is what brings us back to the 
Human-Data Interaction framework. In this toolkit, we focus on the issues of human-data 
interaction, including abuse and harm. 
Theories of studying technology-mediated abuse
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A FEMINIST CRITIQUE OF THE 
HUMAN-DATA INTERACTION FRAMEWORK
(1) HDI has a lack of power discourse within the framework.
One part of our workshops with academics and advocates who support victim-survivors of technology-mediated 
abuse constituted critiquing the existing HDI framework. The conversations across the two workshops can be 
summarised into three key areas: (1) HDI has a lack of power discourse within the framework; (2) There is a need 
for us to see and understand wider ecosystems in which HDI and support sit, rather than focusing only on the 
immediate issue; (3) There is a need to be less outcome-oriented and instead to see the process of designing and 
developing new systems and/or services as equally, if not more important
Our world is underlined by capitalism and patriarchy; and this includes the development and use of digital 
technologies and data-intensive systems. In its current state, the HDI framework is made up of three (or four, 
if counting the most recent extension) separate tenets that all design of data-intensive systems should follow. 
However, these tenets are all based on an individual’s interaction with their data through the system - they do not 
take into account the wider systems in which people and the technologies sit. For example, in today’s world, one 
person’s data impacts on others as well - algorithms are built on data that has been collected from many people, not 
just individuals. 
Thinking about HDI as part of a wider system gives us new opportunities of how we can engage with safety 
concerns and/or the abuse of systems. For example, one participant said: “having processes in place for people to 
report abuse” provides you a space to “respond to it” is also a way of finding out how “your products are being 
misused”. In this statement, we see that a feature (such as a reporting mechanism) can be used for multiple 
purposes, including the improvement of the system; if seen as part of the system. Another participant asks: “do 
we need agency and not just in our computing systems, but actually like in our democratic systems? In our, like, 
the various -isms that are in our governmental and political structures that we live in?” If we see technologies as 
part of our world, as we do in this toolkit, we can see how a participant can ask questions about agency not just 
in our computing systems, but in the world(s) we exist in - different systems of legality, politics, and policy impact 
how we interact with technologies (GDPR in the EU is perhaps a great example of this). The same participant 
asks an important rhetorical question: “Actually, what [...] if we change what we mean with the system, does [our 
conversation] have a completely different impact then?”
If we were to take a more holistic approach to HDI, we would need to not only speak to the interaction between 
people and their data on the individual level, but also on community and institutional levels. In doing so, we then 
must also take into consideration that people are individuals, that not everyone is the same; or as one participant 
said: “It just assumes that everybody is the same, or that everybody has the same abilities, the same rights, the 
same vocabularies and the same languages.” In its current state, HDI seems like a totalizing framework that assumes 
everyone has the same degree of agency and authority to negotiate with those who use their data. This is not the 
case.  Different people and the communities they are a part of will have different needs - and needs of people within 
a single community may also be different. For example, these needs relate to what ‘legible’ means to different 
communities. As one participant said: “To [one group of people] some of the [data] could be complete nonsense, 
almost like a different language, whereas to [...] different users it’s understandable.” 
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(2) There is a need for us to see and understand wider ecosystems in which 
HDI and support sit, rather than focusing only on the immediate issue
As mentioned above already, our technological issues can sometimes be mirrors to our wider social issues. 
However, it is important that we do not outsource our social issues to technology developers and designers; as 
one participant notes: “somewhere we have to acknowledge that we don’t outsource our social issues to try to fix 
them with technology, because that, in all of these frameworks we always run the risk of doing this.” For example, 
if software is developed for a company, workplace rules and hierarchies will constrain human agency as much as, if 
not more, than the software which implements those rules and hierarchies.  This is an incredibly important point 
for us in critiquing the framework, but also in our extension of it. We do not advocate for “the outsourcing of our 
social issues or problems or concerns to technology designers as if they or we have those solutions, of like century 
long, millennia long human problems or human concerns.”
Notions of legibility, agency, and negotiability can be useful, but they are not enough to ensure the ethical use of 
data. As one participant said, it is not enough to “put those principles out there without considering the kind of 
like underlying economic political processes that for why the data is being collected in the first place, and how that 
shapes what data we’re collecting and what we’re doing with it.” This is because these terms do not address the 
issues that sit between these three tenets; or the things that underlie all of them: capitalism and patriarchy. As one 
participant said: the framework “kind of skirts around the issue of what the drive for the data collection is in the 
first place.” 
On top of skirting around the underlying issues of the data collection, the HDI framework also does not take 
into consideration the worries and anxiety that can bubble up in people if they are not aware what information 
is available about them online. This can be especially pronounced for people who are experiencing technology-
mediated abuse and/or those who have experienced other forms of domestic violence, stalking, or other similar 
forms of violence. To summarise our second point of critique of the HDI framework, we ask how we can think about 
abuse that is perpetrated by people using data-intensive systems more holistically? How can we take into account 
the wider power structures that are at play? How can we ensure our data-intensive systems are built in a trauma-
informed way? And how can we best support those who are experiencing abuse through these systems, and those 
who advocate for them?
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(3) There is a need to be more process-oriented and less outcome-oriented 
Thinking seriously about safety in relation to our data-intensive systems is not an easy task. One way that we can 
do this however, is to see the process of designing and developing new systems and/or services as equally, if not 
more important than the outcomes. This may seem contradictory to a design and technology industry that aims to 
ship new products regularly. But in reality, it is a reframing of how we already do our work. Updates and patches are 
shipped often, and can be seen as part of a software/hardware development process that is never quite ‘finished’ - 
there is always an update that can be pushed to make the system better. With this shift in thinking towards process, 
we can counter techno-solutionism and the arrogance that can come with this assumption that new technologies 
can solve our longstanding societal problems. For example, sometimes designers come into spaces of different 
expertise and create a new app or service that aims to solve a particularly complex problem that others have not 
been able to solve yet - or for which there may never be a solution. 
Some technology companies and support organisations are already thinking in this way, as one participant notes: “I 
think there are so many conversations that are going on [...] and I really hope that, sort of, [technology companies] 
can speed themselves to be able to be there for these victims.” As another participant points out though, even 
when data-intensive systems and the technology companies who build them provide support, “there’s also 
something, like, a level of support that is missing.” Survivors of technology-mediated abuse require more than 
responsive technology systems - they require adequate social, psychological, and other forms of support. This same 
participant goes on to make a point about the importance of funding in this space - pointing out that maybe it is a 
matter of “funding the people who provide this kind of support. So funding advocates…more…so that there can be 
more advocates, rather than, like, more technology solutions, or better technology.”
To avoid techno-solutionism, designers and technologists must recognize the expertise of others - in the case of 
improving safety for people using data-intensive systems those people are survivors and advocates. When these 
people work together, equitably, with technologists, we can build and create safer technologies. And if we do that in 
a way that focuses on the process of this building, we can think about violence on our systems more meaningfully: 
we can address it at all stages of the design process, put in place feedback loops, and develop systems that support 
people: as one participant said, the “burden of safety really shouldn’t fall solely on the shoulders of the end user. 
And that’s why we felt is was important that at least some of the onus be shifted onto thoughtful design [...that 
helps...] technologists think about building their products from the ground up to be resistant to abuse.”  It is 
important to note though, that even if we work in the most equitable way, with the best intentions, we will not solve 
the societal issue of violence with new technologies. 
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In summary, we found that the HDI framework is useful in some ways, as it provides 
developers, designers, and technologists to think about how a person can engage with 
the processes of data collection, manipulation, and use by companies. However, it is 
hard to apply this logic to people who sit outside the box of the traditional ‘user’ that we 
think about when we design; even more so if that person has experienced or is currently 
experiencing the abuse of data or data-intensive systems to cause them physical, 
psychological, or other forms of harm. As one of the participants in our research noted, 
this is “maybe [because] the technical community is quite focussed on the optimistic 
side of their amazing technology that they’re producing every day. That, it’s difficult to 
think that something you produced, something you spent time writing, is being used to 
cause harm.” 
After reflecting on the HDI framework with researchers and practitioners, we concluded 
that it lacked a discrete discussion of power and that it does not situate data and data-
intensive systems within wider ecosystems of use. Instead, it focuses solely on immediate 
issues at hand for individuals whose data is being used in ways that they do not approve 
of. We have already pointed towards some ways in which these issues can be addressed 
above, including a move towards being more process-oriented rather than output-
oriented in the development of new data-intensive technologies. We believe that when 
we do this, we can learn to make small changes throughout a product development 
roadmap, with which we can make positive changes for those who are most vulnerable to 
technology-mediated abuse or other forms of exploitation and misuse of data-intensive 
systems. To be able to address this issue more meaningfully through the HDI framework, 
we present two new tenets with which we want to extend the existing HDI framework: 
trust and abusability. 
Summary
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You would be hard pressed to find words as rich in meaning and application as the term trust. In most instances 
when we talk about trust, we talk about how trustworthy something is, such as “I trust this source of information 
because its from a reputable source”; or we may talk about how we place people in positions of responsibility, such 
as being in a position of trust as a developer; or perhaps even that we want to indicate that we expect something 
to happen, such as trusting that the software will act as planned. But what exactly are we talking about when we 
talk about trust, and, most importantly, why is it important to Human-Data Interaction? Trust is unique in that 
it has a special relationship with risk, with some scholars even arguing that only under conditions of risk is trust 
needed. Not all definitions will state this explicitly, with some describing trust through likelihood, confidence, and 
predictability 
Curiously, trust is there even if we don’t realise its presence. Marsh and Dibben (2003) argue, trust may underline 
every decision we make about what we do, how we do them and why. This means it also underlines our interactions 
with data-intensive systems and other technologies. 
Maxine-Laurie Marshall (2018) expands this to claim that “trust is intrinsic to our everyday lives and the function of 
society as a whole”. As we cannot predict for certain what will happen in our lives, we have to expose ourselves to 
the risk of uncertainty in our actions and beliefs, we have to trust in people, processes and situations. If we did not 
hold a degree of trust in anything, there is little in life we would be able to do. Yet given that trust is so pervasive in 
every interaction we have, it seems curious we have yet to explore what the implications for trust are, particularly 
when technology companies move at such a rapid pace that demand we place trust in something far faster than 
we would have been able to previously. This has significant implications for when we consider how such digital 
technologies may be leveraged to conduct interpersonal abuse. Notably the current zeitgeist has seen glimmers in 
works that question whether big technology companies should be permitted to hold such positions of trust over 
our personal information and data (Shipman & Marshall, 2020; Baig et al, 2020). However, we need to go further 
when examining how data, design and digital systems might be misused in cases of interpersonal violence to ensure 
that we do not inadvertently increase the negative experiences of already vulnerable people. Simply, if we are 
thinking about data, design, and digital systems we need to think about trust. And we need to think about trust not 
just at one point in the design cycle, but throughout the entire development and deployment cycle - we outline 
some ways this can be done below. 
After conducting a rapid evidence review we examined how trust was being discussed in literature where a person 
of concern was actively misusing digital technologies (be it devices, systems, or services) to cause direct harm to 
another person. Based on our search criteria, we identified a range of different sources of information to look at 
on Human-Computer Interaction and Information Science; from technology-facilitated abuse in former and current 
intimate partnerships to organisational misuse of employee-tracking software. With the exception of a few notable 
works (Marques et al, 2019; Tseng et al, 2021), works did not explicitly position trust as an important factor to 
examining  their research on interpersonal violence. In response to this lack of engagement with the terminology of 
‘trust’, we formulated three factors that we deemed important to discuss further: the dynamism of interpersonal 
trust and encouraging researchers to explore meanings of ‘trust’ beyond the trustworthiness in systems. To end 
this section we highlight what developers, technologists, and researchers can do to interrogate the role ‘trust’ 
plays between the people who are intended to use their systems, the people who may be abusing the systems, and 
between the people who may be interacting through the system. 
Introduction
ROSANNA BELLINI
A feminist extension of the Human-Data 
Interaction framework: Trust
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One of the most important qualities that trust possesses is the fact that it is dynamic; meaning that it can change 
based on external changes. Julia Slupska discusses how smart home threat models understand trust to be a static 
feature, when in actuality it can dramatically change over time (Slupska, 2019). Indeed, it is so volatile that many 
scholars describe it as a “weak-link concept” (Sherchan et al, 2013), that once a single violation of trust occurs (such 
as a data leak of personal information) it may be very hard or impossible to restore that level of trust to original 
levels. This dynamism makes this concept challenging to address, but at the same time absolutely crucial to work 
with in a time-sensitive and context-aware manner. It means that we need to get our understanding of  what our 
dynamic and context-aware ‘trust’ looks like right the first time for there to be hope of delivering data-intensive 
services in ways that understand power, justice and equitable access. This is by no means an easy task as it is a very 
hard thing to get right, but understanding that trust looks different for different people in different contexts is a 
good starting point for challenging assumptions and in turn developing more useful and safe systems. 
The dynamism of trust in interpersonal relationships
As mentioned previously, trust has a lot of different interpretations to different areas of knowledge and it 
is no surprise that many scholars have latched onto the psychological definition that prioritises scrutinising 
trustworthiness in people, sources of information, and systems. As Kittur et al. (2008) point out, arguing to increase 
trust in a system can equate to an overarching goal of encouraging people to use a system in the first place. In 
turn, this can have a positive impact such as increasing the depth of resources on Wikipedia. However, increasing 
engagement can be maliciously taken advantage of to feed the attention economy, ensuring that more people spend 
more time on a platform, and in some cases directly increasing the ways that people can spend money. Here, claims 
to increase trustworthiness, if used naively to be a replacement for recruitment into digital architecture where a 
user’s attention, may lead to information and behaviour may be packed up for profit and sold to external companies 
(Zuboff, 2019). This more malicious intent however, is not always the conscious goals of the scholars or the 
companies who develop these services. Arguably, increasing the level of confidence and trust in information about 
one’s health online is, at face value, apositive. However, in cases of interpersonal violence, such as image-based 
sexual abuse (McGlynn & Rackley, 2017; Powell et al, 2020), encouraging a victim-survivor of such abuse to trust in 
the reporting process of the same website that hosts material that causes them harm can further those feelings of 
harm by producing a trauma response. Indeed, we must question whether ‘increasing the trustworthiness’ of such 
situations can really bring about the outcomes desired by the end users; If we are genuinely interested in delivering 
justice, equality and fairness for such individuals, we must not simply define trust as a synonym for engagement 
and attention that can be exploited for profit, but seek to engage with what a positive belief in a process for justice 
might look like.
Looking beyond trustworthiness, and the need to understanding trust and its complexities
As Strohmayer has already discussed in a previous section in this toolkit, we argue that technology cannot simply 
provide the answers to problems without inadvertently creating new ones or exacerbating others. I build on this 
assertion that technologies can encourage us to examine new questions about ourselves and our connections with 
others; and we should have the confidence to ask questions of such devices. In our review, we kept returning to 
the same questions about trust, which we found useful to explore the relationship between technologies, trust, and 
abuse. These questions can be used to evaluate how data-intensive systems and the companies who own them talk 
about ‘trust’ to better understand why they want users to trust their system (ie. is it solely to improve engagement 
or a genuine attempt to improve safety of peoples using their system?) . These questions can also be used to 
interrogate new technologies that are being designed, but must be repeated several times throughout the design 
process and after deployment.
Asking the right questions
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We hope the above questions help interrogate the meanings of trust in how, why, when, and 
where we use certain technologies. Looking towards the development of new systems, we 
have to continue to question what kinds of interpersonal trust we wish to support. 
     Can your digital system really be trusted by victim-survivors of interpersonal violence 
mediated through the system? 
     Do users of your system trust workers in your company enough to reach out to them when 
something harmful has happened? 
     Can the people who use your system really trust in the reporting process and trust that 
using it will lead to an outcome that they are satisfied with?  
While digital technologies haven’t changed the definition of trust entirely, they have changed 
the process in how we trust in systems and in other people. Indeed, trust in a digital sense 
brings about new ways that we might trust what we expect of processes and other people, 
and how we might interact with each other around support and abuse. While this has brought 
about positive benefits such as trusting in caring services that try to mitigate technology-
facilitated abuse, this can mean we trust too easily in processes that do not have our best 
interests at heart.
Is trust being used as a verb or a noun? 
Going back to our school days for a moment, we may be reminded that a verb is a ‘doing 
word’ while a noun is a ‘naming word’. The power behind these two descriptions is that of 
action, movement or, conversely, staticity. When we talk about trust as a noun, we have a 
tendency to understand it as somewhat fixed, permanent and its meaning shared and agreed 
upon by everyone involved. When we talk about trust as a verb however, we see the opposite: 
as flexible, temporal, and highly context-dependent. Its use in one way was not necessarily 
superior to another, as it holds different purposes depending on how it is used.
Who, where and why do we Trust?
This question targets  exactly what we are talking about when we refer to contexts of trust. 
The who attempts to question if it is a person or an organisation that we are supposed to 
trust. Do we have assurances that a company will have its users in mind, or is it a case of 
placing trust in an individual at such a service; for example, someone managing a report of 
harm within the company? The where asks about the geographic or conceptual location of 
trust,such as a reporting process, a social innovation team, or a physical work space. Are 
we more likely to trust some of these contexts than others? And if this is the case, why is 
this the case? Finally the why asks about the purpose of trust in digital systems in a specific 
context. Why is it in our interests to trust a system or the company who runs it? Why does a 
company wish me to place my trust in it or a service it runs?
How do we Trust? 
How we trust encourages us to examine the processes, manners, and ways in which we trust 
in digital systems. Research articles may not explore this as the answer may be implicit: using 
something means we trust in it. However, is it realistic to assume that someone has to trust in 
a process or system to use it in the first place? Or can we consider that people may distrust a 
service yet have no other choice than to engage with using it? 
Summary
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When developing new technologies, designers like to focus on the positive: what will this 
enable? What will this optimise? How will it change the world (for the better!)? As a discipline, 
information security often handles the negative, asking instead, how can something go wrong? 
Yet the way infosec experts ask these questions is usually too narrow, focusing on how an 
external malicious actor might penetrate a system to steal data or wreak havoc, rather than 
how an authorised user might (mis)use the system for harm. Likewise, designers tend to 
assume authorised users are not malicious. This section explores the concept of ‘abusability’, 
which offers a potential route to systematic and rigorous methods for mitigating abuse of 
technology, and why it is important to integrate this into the HDI framework.
Abusability is defined as the possibility that malicious actors might hijack or weaponise a 
system for harmful activity; designers have a responsibility to anticipate and mitigate this 
(Calderon et al, 2019). In this sense, abusability is similar to the concept of ‘dual use scenarios’ 
in cybersecurity and weapons research. Many technologies, like nuclear power or artificial 
intelligence, can be used for both military and peaceful purposes. The challenge of diplomacy 
on dual use technologies is to allow innovation while limiting harmful uses. Abusability 
addresses similar problems at the level of interpersonal, rather than international, relations.
The concept of “abusability” plays on the concept of “usability” to ask what kinds of uses 
should be restricted rather than enabled in design (Greenberg, 2019). In doing so, it invites 
designers to anticipate, mitigate and respond to abuse in the same way that designers might 
consider usability at various stages of the product development lifecycle.
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The chart below depicts this process: the concept stage includes brainstorming, planning 
and market research. Engineers then take this concept and translating it into specific 
‘requirements’ or features and functionality. At the design and development, developers 
implement these requirements in a model product. The model product is then tested for 
usability and other criteria, before being released. Once the product is on the market, 
maintenance involves utilisation and support for customers. Lastly, “end-of-life” involves 
disposal or recycling of the product, as well as the afterlife of the data created by the 
product of platform. Although this chart shows a linear progression, in reality products will 
go through multiple iterations, for example returning to the design or requirements stage 
for updates or if testing reveals some problems.
Explaining the secure systems development lifecycle
A feminist extension of the Human-Data 
Interaction framework: Abusability
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Abusability should be incorporated at various stages of the design lifecycle. As 
engineers set requirements (although this may also happen at the design stage), they 
should conduct an abuse threat modelling exercise asking: how might this product be 
abused for harm (Slupska and Tanczer, 2021; PenzeyMoog, 2021)? Once the product is 
developed, abusability tests include abuse scenarios akin to penetration testing, in which 
a malicious actor attempts to use the product for harm (Parkin et al, 2019). Results are 
fed back into product documentation or policies, or in more serious cases, the product 
is withdrawn or sent back for redesign. Once the product is on the market, the company 
offers a robust abuse reporting feature and support for rectification (Zou et al, 2020), 
monitoring which aspects of the product are being abused and looking for ways to 
mitigate this in the future.
Further resources for exploring abusability:
Roxanne Leitao’s work (2019) involving survivors of intimate partner violence in 
anticipating harmful uses of smart home devices
IBM research (2020) on Coercive Control Resistant Design offers principles for 
designers seeking to address coercive control  
Chayn, an organisation which uses crowd sourcing to develop resources for survivors 
of domestic violence, has developed principles for trauma-informed design (2021)
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Abusability threat assessment and testing reframes security’s traditional focus on an 
external attacker penetrating or subverting a system from its intended or authorised 
purpose, to ask how people use features for harm. In Soltani’s initial formulation, these 
harms had to do with national security and international politics: for example, nation states 
using Facebook for election interference. However, we argue this concept is particularly 
helpful for thinking about technology-facilitated harm within intimate relationships. 
 
The Cornell IPV Tech Team uses the concept of a “UI-bound adversary” (UI stands for user 
interface) to indicate an attacker who is not technologically sophisticated and therefore is 
limited to using a product’s features and user interface in their attacks. For example, in an 
abusability attack, a perpetrator might co-opts the features of an app like ‘Find My Friends’ 
which is meant to help friends keep track of each others locations, to stalk or control the 
movements of a current or former partner. In contrast, a prototypical information security 
attack like an SQL injection, involves compromising a database by inputting malicious code. 
Both attacks involve subverting a system from its intended focus, but in the former, the 
perpetrator is using the features of the system “correctly” (but maliciously) while in the 
latter, the attacker is “breaking in” to the system. It is useful to remember that many typical 
abusability attacks do threaten classic information security principles like “confidentiality”, 
“availability” or “integrity” and therefore these are not a separate classes of attack. 
However, abusability attacks are often missed or dismissed in infosec (information security) 
research (Slupska, 2019).
Abuse of Power Comes as No Surprise
SECURITY VS ABUSABILITY:
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How we understand what “counts” as a security issue, and what is worthy of designers and 
infosec experts’ time, is a matter of how we understand power. By considering abusability 
through a feminist lens, we propose that technology designers must pay close attention to the 
power relations that are mediated by their products. Abusability is a reminder that power will 
often be abused, or as the old feminist slogan puts it “abuse of power comes as no surprise.”
“Coercive control” is an act or a pattern of acts of assault, threats, humiliation and 
intimidation or other abuse that is used to harm, punish, or frighten. The term is used 
to make it clear that “domestic violence” does not always include physical violence, and 
does not only occur in cohabitating relationships. Coercive control has always happened 
in intimate relationships, and now these patterns of abuse are being reinvented with new 
technologies. Technology will not solve these problems, which are fundamentally a matter 
of values and power, but ignoring them only makes them worse.
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Although abusability is critical at the design stage (where it is preventative), it is also important to address abuse 
once it has happened. Both, the advocates who were interviewed for this project and those who attended our 
workshop, emphasized the importance of building response systems which have a relational dynamic with victim 
services: responding to problems as they arise and developing support systems for redressing cases of abuse. 
The illustration below shows the different steps organisations can take to incorporate notions of abusability into 
their product design and organisational practices. Referencing the concept of maturity models, we present this as a 
development of maturity levels. We want to highlight that these steps relate to all sorts of forms of potential abuse 
of a system, but we are using a ‘reporting abuse’ feature as an example to illustrate the argument we are making. 
Adding to this, the companies who are perhaps most organizationally mature, might not be the companies who are 
most mature in relation to their understanding of abusability and their treatment of abuse on their platforms.
This diagram can help organisations mobilise to meaningfully incorporate abusability as concrete actions 
throughout their project lifecycles. This is a high level overview and not a full maturity model that would be used in 
industry for evaluating health and safety practices; however, such details could be fleshed out in the future.
Building responsive systems 
MATURITY MODEL:
2 Company actions to address abuse incorporate principles of “trauma-informed” or “coercive control resistant” design. Tech abuse survivors and advocates are consulted at different stages of product development, their input is fairly compensated and their 
feedback is taken seriously (in contrast with level -1 where advocates are only 
consulted after product is developed).
Meaningful engagement Eg: The abuse reporting feature 
incorporates trauma-informed language 
to avoid triggering survivors. Both 
advocates and survivors were consulted 
in early stages of developing abuse 
reporting feature.
1
Company has taken action to mitigate and redress abuse on its platform or using its 
products, for example through: Including tech abuse in threat modelling or abusability 
testing; understanding how measures implemented to prevent abuse-such as reporting 
features or content moderation-can themselves be abuse; incorporating abuse into 
content moderation policies and features (such as automated detection) linked to abuse 
reporting function; offering options to survivors such as blocking perpetrators. 
Unfortunately, this level often includes “Trust and Safety” or “Responsible Innovation” 
positions without sufficient mechanisms for those teams to have enough power to 
actually shift design decisions.
Taking action
Eg: The abuse reporting feature is tied 
to measures like content moderation or 
blocking which can help defend the 
abuse survivor against further harm. 
Data from the abuse reporting feature is 
incorporated into threat modelling and 
abusability testing.
0 Key decision-makers in company demonstrate an awareness of technology abuse broadly (through reading key resources) and how technology abuse occurs in their products and platforms specifically. This includes research and active reflection on questions like:What kinds of abuse occur on our platforms, products, or devices?
Who is disproportionately affected by this kind of abuse?
How does this abuse relate to specific product features?
Organisational awareness
Eg: Platform includes an abuse reporting 
function. Aggregate data from the abuse 
reporting function are presented to and 
understood by key decision-makers.
Company either ignores the problem of technology abuse or addresses it superficially 
through: Ethics-washing: a performative display of interest in countering abuse without 
meaningful action; Tokenism: seeking approval or a “green stamp” on an already 
developed project from advocates or survivors without meaningfully consulting them.
Actively facilitating abuse-2
Thank you to Toby Shulruff at the National Network to 
End Domestic Violence for pointing out this lowest level.
Eg: No abuse reporting function 
OR a reporting function which 
is usually ignored
-1 Company designs and sells spyware or covert monitoring devices which are easily used for abuse. Willful ignorance Eg: These companies usually ignore reports that their products are used for abuse
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Through abusability, we focus on psychological, emotional and 
physical harm rather than damage to property or data in vulnerable 
systems (which is the focus of conventional information security) 
though these may also be involved. Instead of defending company 
profits against data breaches, we need to ask what groups and 
individuals are made marginal through abuse on our platforms and 
devices, and what kinds of harms are exacerbated by abuse.
Abusability plays on the concept of “usability” to ask what 
kinds of uses should be restricted rather than enabled in 
design. These questions should be incorporated at the design, 
testing and maintenance stage of product design. Mature company 
practices in this space will move beyond tokenistic inclusion and 
meaningfully involve survivors and advocates in designing both 
preventative measures and responses to abuse.
The concept of abusability is a critical addition to the HDI framework 
because it offers a practical way to incorporate power dynamics into 
designing human-data interactions. By understanding that agency 
is not always a good, as agency can also be a perpetrator’s agency 
to harm others, we introduce more critical self-reflection into the 
design process. Feminists have long known that abuse of power 
comes as no surprise; it’s time for tech companies to stop being 




As we have shown in the above extensions of the HDI framework, thinking about trust and 
abusability throughout a project lifecycle are incredibly important when wanting to design 
technologies that are safety-conscious. To better illustrate what the use of these terms can 
look like in practice, we present a series of three case studies below. In these case studies, 
we first describe a situation that has taken place, based on interviews with advocates for 
people who have experienced technology-mediated abuse. After this, we present a short 
analysis of this case study, followed by a series of questions that can be useful starting 
points for reflection. 
We hope that these case studies can help kick-start conversations about trust and 
abusability. We also present them as resources at the end of the toolkit to be used as part of 
your meetings, trainings, teaching, or personal development. 
A woman was recorded for 10 years in her home by her partner without her knowledge. 
Her partner is now using 10 years of security camera footage against her to fight a custody 
battle. The partner was able to self-select footage that suited his case and omitted evidence 
of his own behaviours. The court case was broadcast live due to covid-19. The advocate 
was able to support the woman by using her organisation’s resources to help the woman 
“understand and validate her experience of coercive control, because sometimes she 
doubted her own experiences of whether she was in an abusive relationship” because the 
relationship had not been physically abusive. The advocate also encouraged her to collect 
evidence of threatening messages. “You start peeling the layers that society has, like you 
know, put on women’s minds about compromise and understanding the other person 
and they start seeing the situation for what it is. I think that is a very heavily under- under 
appreciated like services to support survivors understanding”
CASE STUDY 1: COURT CASE WITH HIDDEN CAMERAS
In this case, as in many cases of technology abuse, supporting survivors by validating and 
helping them articulate their experience of abuse as abuse is a critical part of the support 
advocates give
Analysis
How can platforms support survivors ability to collect evidence?
How can platforms and legal systems prevent perpetrators from abusing mechanisms 
that are meant to ensure justice (like content reporting features or court cases)?
Questions for reflection
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Pornhub, without seeking or getting permission, links to an advocates’ organisations’ 
Facebook page on its “Non-Consensual Content Policy” website, which results in 
thousands of people from all over the world reaching out for support with cases of image-
based sexual abuse. The advocate spends an increasing amount of her time helping people 
navigate Pornhub and other platforms, like Facebook’s, non-consensual content policies. 
She said “the thing that’s really disheartening and upsetting, is that, you know, someone 
reaches out to me to support them. Like immediately [...] like I’m really going to be like [...] 
Okay let me just get let me just get Mark on the phone quickly and I’m like yo Zuckerberg 
[...] take this down quickly.”
This is challenging as it often takes weeks to get non-consensual content removed, and 
then when you do get it removed, there is no support for getting evidence to prove it 
e.g. in a court of law. As a result, she said “It’s like I don’t have the funding anymore to do 
this work and I can’t stop either right? [...] And it’s not like- this isn’t my role [..] I’m not a 
trained counsellor. But like I said, people just want to hear a soothing voice and you know 
somewhat be directed to what they need to do.”
CASE STUDY 2: PORNHUB WEBSITE REFERRALS
Although it is good that Pornhub at least has a page for people who experience non-
consensual content sharing, the fact that it is burdening these support services without 
compensating them for their labour is problematic. It would be better if both Pornhub 
contacted these agencies first. It would also be helpful if both Pornhub and Facebook 
offered some form of phone or email support to people experiencing abuse to help them 
with the process of takedowns. However, it is also invaluable to have independent services 
that provide emotional and technical support to survivors navigating these systems.
Analysis
What kind of support should companies provide survivors of abuse on their platforms?




Ring doorbell cameras are small cameras placed in peepholes which notify you via a smartphone or desktop app 
when anyone presses your doorbell. When installed by perpetrators or linked up to a perpetrators phone, Ring 
cameras can become an intrusive surveillance device, notifying an abuser about the survivors movements and 
guests to their home. This can isolate the survivor, as “now the perpetrator knows whenever she’s leaving the 
house” (tech abuse advocate).
However, Ring cameras can also be used by survivors to secure their home against a stalker or an abusive ex-
partner. They can help provide the survivor with a sense of security, or help them collect evidence of stalking 
used for a court case. For this reason, some advocates have reached out to Ring to ask for discounted cameras 
for survivors. One advocate described these doorbell cameras as “a real way for the client to kind of take back 
her safety and like a little bit of peace of mind.”
CASE STUDY 3: RING CAMERAS AND INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE
Ring cameras pose both risks and opportunities for survivors of intimate partner violence. They also bring survivors 
into broader systems of data collection and surveillance: in recent years, Ring (which is owned by Amazon) has 
partnered with hundreds of US law enforcement agencies, offering departments access to its platform so that 
police can request the video recorded by homeowners’ cameras within a specific time and area (Harwell, 2019).
Evidence and abusability: Collecting evidence, for example, screenshots of abusive messages, or a data log which 
records account compromise, is critical for redressing abuse, especially through legal routes such as reporting to 
law enforcement, getting a restraining order, or going to court. However, we must remember that both evidence-
collection and court systems are themselves subject to abuse.
Expertise: Advocates in domestic violence, sexual violence, and digital privacy support services are experts in safety 
and abuse through their work supporting survivors. Their insights on the ways that technology can be abused are 
critical for anticipating and mitigating abusability in technology design. Advocates also deserve to be compensated 
fairly for their insights. Unfortunately, technology companies can often treat advocates from civil society and social 
workers with a level of condescension. A common pitfall is that tech companies will develop a technology solution 
without advocate or survivor input, and then reaching out to advocacy groups only to test the pilot. Another pitfall 
is taking advocates time for granted, assuming they will be grateful for any tech company involvement at all.
Analysis
Can one design a doorbell camera to be useful for survivors but not perpetrators of abuse?
What are the implications of partnerships like Ring’s partnership with police, particularly for marginalised 
communities?
Questions for reflection
Across the three case studies, it is possible to see two important areas that appear time and time again: (1) the 
importance of evidence in cases where data-intensive technologies have been used by people to abuse others; 
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Resources:
In this final section of the Feminist HDI toolkit, we present a series of 
resources that bring together many of the points we have raised in 
Parts 1 and 2. These resources are stand-alone documents that can be 
printed separately, photocopied, hung up on a wall, and shared offline. 
These resources include ideas for the design of new technologies to 
ensure they take trust and abusability into consideration. This also 
includes implications for technology companies who want to protect 
those who use their systems - we provide ideas how companies can 
better support survivors and treat perpetrators of online harms. 
Following this, we take a look at the design and development cycles of 
new systems. We present the ‘secure system engineering life cycle’ as 
an illustration that can be shared with designers in trainings and in a 
format where this can be hung up on an office wall. This cycle is also 
illustrated with an example that presents different stages at which 
reporting functions can be used to promote safer engagement with 
data-intensive systems. 
Finally, we point towards a different audience: journalists. We present 
a series of good practice guidelines that will help journalists write 
about harms, abusability, and trust in data-intensive systems.
We present 5 resources:
We hope that the flyers, posters, and infographics will 
be useful for people in working towards developing 
safer data-intensive systems and technologies.
Implications for advocates and others who support survivors
Implications for designing technologies for survivors and 
perpetrators
Describing the secure systems development lifecycle
Case Studies: examples, analysis, and questions for discussion
Taking Abusability seriously in your technology company or 
system: Presenting levels of maturity
Do’s and Don’ts for journalists covering technology-mediated 
abuse
Angelika Strohmayer, Julia Slupska, Rosanna Bellini, 
Gina Neff, Lynne Coventry, Tara Hairston, Adam Dodge
EPSRC’s Human-Data Interaction Network+ (EP/R045178/1)
IMPLICATIONS FOR ADVOCATES AND
OTHERS WHO SUPPORT SURVIVORS
This advice is drawn from interviews with other advocates working on digital privacy 
and technology-facilitated abuse, as well as our review of background literature.
Julia Slupska
RECOMENDATIONS FOR SUPPORTING SURVIVORS:
RECOMENDATIONS FOR ENGAGING WITH TECH COMPANIES:
Maintain a general awareness of technology abuse and how to identify it, as well as 
general digital security precautions like password management, multifactor authentication, 
and VPNs. This is not meant to be an introductory resource for learning about technology 
abuse: for that we recommend Refuge’s Tech Safety site (https://refugetechsafety.org/).
Explaining how to download and use these tools step by step: instead of giving 
general advice, “don’t be afraid to get your hands a little dirty when it comes to technology 
and give actionable advice whenever possible”
Be confident in what you do know: a lack of confidence in engaging with technology 
can be an unnecessary limitation. Many advocates repeated how often “just googling it” 
can prove to be a significant help to survivors.
Avoid telling survivors to get off social media as that can be detrimental to survivors.
Remember you have valuable expertise in technology safety and abuse: knowledge 
of how things go wrong on the ground is critical and should be respected by tech designers.
Don’t be afraid to ask for compensation for consultation: tech companies should 
respect and compensate your expertise; it is inappropriate to ask you to contribute 
these for free.
Be realistic with threat models: a particular risk for advocates coming from the digital 
privacy or cybersecurity space is “judging [survivors] very harshly, scaring them, giving 
them advice that is meant for protecting them from nation states or law enforcement 
rather than their [...] abusers level of technical skill.”
Pay attention to children’s accounts and devices in threat assessment
Angelika Strohmayer, Julia Slupska, Rosanna Bellini, 
Gina Neff, Lynne Coventry, Tara Hairston, Adam Dodge
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DESIGNING FOR SURVIVORS
AND PERPETRATORS:
Rosie Bellini & Julia Slupska
When designing to mitigate abusability, you are necessarily designing for both survivors and 
perpetrators. This sentence may not initially make sense, and you may be asking; why would 
I want to design for perpetrators? If we are to consider how to make their products and/
or services more safe, welcoming, and empowering for survivors, we must also think about 
how to prevent or limit abusive behaviours. While this may be complicated and challenging, 
it is worth the extra consideration both to protect marginalised users and because, as 
Penzey-Moog (2021) argues, designing for survivors makes products and services better 
for everyone (or at least, everyone who is not trying to cause harm). For example, taking an 
abusive use case into consideration leads to features like separating shared accounts that 
might help anyone going through other life situations, such as a break-up.
In this section, we outline some considerations for designing for survivors and perpetrators. 
We look at dating apps as a case study due to their close proximity to intimate partner 
violence and sexual violence.
SURVIVORS
users should have as much control as 
possible over how others can interact 
with them and how their information 
is shared
CONSENT
Implication Case study: dating apps
One positive example is an app that allows users to limit sharing of sensitive 
details, such as age, location, or sexual preferences. Another way an app can 
be consent-oriented is by allowing users to restrict who can contact them, for 
example to only allow ‘matches’ which the user has selected to message them.
A feature which continually shares other users' proximity (for example, disclosing they 
are 5 kilometers away) can create a lot of anxiety for someone who has experienced 
stalking or is currently in an abusive relationship, reminding them that their perpetrator 
is still nearby. If this feature exists, it should be possible and easy to turn it off.
RETRAUMATISATION
designers should consider how certain 
things can be triggering to people who 
have experienced trauma
If users are exposed to abuse, users are quickly able to smartly evidence this abuse 
and attach other offending behaviours to a blocking system that is transparent, 
encouraging and extends support beyond the original blocking request. 
When responding to complaints, platforms should try as much as possible to meet 
the needs of the person who experienced harm, for example by keeping survivors 
informed on how their complaints are addressed (i.e. will the perpetrator be 
removed from the platform, why or why not) to provide closure, rather than 
leaving them wondering whether their complaint led to anything.
RESTITUTION
approaches drawing on restorative 
justice focus on meeting the needs 
of a person who has been harmed 
PREVENTATIVE 
ACTIONS/MESSAGING
Implication Case study: dating apps
If an abusive phrase or slur is detected in the system, it alerts the sender via a 
notification that this language is unacceptable on the dating platform. A smart 
messaging system may suggest an alternative or prevent the message from being sent. 
If an alternative is unavailable, for example, if a potential perpetrator is struggling with 
desisting from using abusive language, a notification/alert is displayed to the 
perpetrator of the community guidelines for using the platform.
Dating app companies are aware that their location systems may be used for stalking, 
and as such they turn off location tracking by default for all users. If a person’s location 
is being continuously monitored then a system notification may request why this 
potential perpetrator is behaving in this way.
ANTICIPATING 
FORMS OF ABUSE
Simply blocking content or removing a user from a platform does not really encourage 
accountability and may even discourage the perpetrator from taking responsibility 
(Salehi, 2020). Features that explain to a user why their behaviour is harmful 
encourage perpetrators to understand harm and work to repair it, for example, by 
working to avoid the behaviour in the future or even sending an apology. However, 
contact from the perpetrator may not be appropriate for many abuse cases, so this 
should be carefully mediated and only permitted with the survivor’s consent.
ACCOUNTABILITY
users who are writing 
unacceptable messages could be 
alerted to this
when designers know about risky 
features, these should be opt-in
systems should explain to people 
their reasons for being removed 
from the system to encourage 
accountability rather than simply 
punishing
Angelika Strohmayer, Julia Slupska, Rosanna Bellini, 
Gina Neff, Lynne Coventry, Tara Hairston, Adam Dodge
EPSRC’s Human-Data Interaction Network+ (EP/R045178/1)
PERPETRATORS
Angelika Strohmayer, Julia Slupska, Rosanna Bellini, 
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SUGGESTIONS FOR HOW YOU COULD PICK A FEATURE AND DO THIS YOURSELVES
First things first, identify a feature. A feature is a unique aspect that allows you to do something with a system, 
service or device. For example, a messaging app might have several features around communication, such as:
This helps to identify where the power imbalance might be, such as who is in the driving seat of these features 
(not forgetting the designers and developers who implemented them of course) and consider how such a 
feature could be used to cause harm. This is the tricky part of the exercise, but consider placing yourself in 
the shoes of a user who has just had a bad interaction with a feature and may come away feeling frustrated.
Here we are designing for perpetrators, a hypothetical perpetrator who may cause damage and harm. 
We also should consider that if someone is using bad behaviours, we could consider pairing these 
features with notifications that provide support or services for abusive behaviours in the local area.
Then, identify what the initial goal of the introduction of that feature was, asking 




An indicator that lets the sender know the receiver has 
a) received their message and/or b) read the message
A way of expanding communication for the sender 
beyond text such as emotions or reactions





A sender could harass a receiver 
as to why they have not replied 
to their messages.
A sender could share 
intimidating or ‘coded’ 
messages through imagery.
A sender could send abusive 
texts and then rely on the 
disappearing message feature 
to remove the evidence.
An indicator that lets the sender know the receiver has 
a) received their message and/or b) read the message
A way of expanding communication for the sender 
beyond text such as emotions or reactions





When designing to mitigate abusability, you are necessarily designing for both survivors and perpetrators. This sentence may not initially make sense, and you may be asking; why would I want to design for perpetrators? 
If we are to consider how to make their products and/or services more safe, welcoming, and empowering for survivors and how to prevent or limit abusive behaviours. While this may be complicated and challenging, it 
is worth the extra consideration both to protect marginalised users and because, as Penzey-Moog (2021) argues, designing for survivors makes products and services better for everyone (or at least, everyone who is not 
trying to cause harm). For example, taking an abusive use case into consideration leads to features like separating shared accounts that might help anyone going through other life situations, such as a break-up. In this 
section, we outline some considerations for designing for survivors and perpetrators. We look at dating apps as a case study due to their close proximity to intimate partner violence and sexual violence.
Rosie Bellini & Julia Slupska
Designing for Survivors and Perpetrators:
DATING APPS AS A CASE STUDY
SURVIVORS
PERPETRATORS
A sender could harass a receiver 
as to why they have not replied 
to their messages.
A sender could share 
intimidating or ‘coded’ 
messages through imagery.
A sender could send abusive 
texts and then rely on the 
disappearing message feature 
to remove the evidence.
An indicator that lets the sender know the receiver has 
a) received their message and/or b) read the message
A way of expanding communication for the sender 
beyond text such as emotions or reactions





An indicator that lets the sender know the receiver has 
a) received their message and/or b) read the message
A way of expanding communication for the sender 
beyond text such as emotions or reactions





users should have as much control as 
possible over how others can interact 
with them and how their information 
is shared
CONSENT
Implication Case study: dating apps
One positive example is an app that allows users to limit sharing of sensitive 
details, such as age, location, or sexual preferences. Another way an app can 
be consent-oriented is by allowing users to restrict who can contact them, for 
example to only allow ‘matches’ which the user has selected to message them.
A feature which continually shares other users' proximity (for example, disclosing they 
are 5 kilometers away) can create a lot of anxiety for someone who has experienced 
stalking or is currently in an abusive relationship, reminding them that their perpetrator 
is still nearby. If this feature exists, it should be possible and easy to turn it off.
RETRAUMATISATION
designers should consider how certain 
things can be triggering to people who 
have experienced trauma
If users are exposed to abuse, users are quickly able to smartly evidence this abuse 
and attach other offending behaviours to a blocking system that is transparent, 
encouraging and extends support beyond the original blocking request. 
When responding to complaints, platforms should try as much as possible to meet 
the needs of the person who experienced harm, for example by keeping survivors 
informed on how their complaints are addressed (i.e. will the perpetrator be 
removed from the platform, why or why not) to provide closure, rather than 
leaving them wondering whether their complaint led to anything.
RESTITUTION
approaches drawing on restorative 
justice focus on meeting the needs 
of a person who has been harmed
SUGGESTIONS FOR HOW YOU COULD PICK A FEATURE AND DO THIS YOURSELVES
Here we are designing for perpetrators, a hypothetical perpetrator who may cause damage and harm. We also should 
consider that if someone is using bad behaviours, we could consider pairing these features with notifications that 
provide support or services for abusive behaviours in the local area.
This helps to identify where the power imbalance might be, such as who is in the driving seat of these features (not 
forgetting the designers and developers who implemented them of course) and consider how such a feature could 
be used to cause harm. This is the tricky part of the exercise, but consider placing yourself in the shoes of a user 
who has just had a bad interaction with a feature and may come away feeling frustrated.
Then, identify what the initial goal of the introduction of that feature was, asking 
what did a company or provider want their users to achieve with this feature?
First things first, identify a feature. A feature is a unique aspect that allows you to do something with a system, 
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PREVENTATIVE 
ACTIONS/MESSAGING
Implication Case study: dating apps
If an abusive phrase or slur is detected in the system, it alerts the sender via a 
notification that this language is unacceptable on the dating platform. A smart 
messaging system may suggest an alternative or prevent the message from being sent. 
If an alternative is unavailable, for example, if a potential perpetrator is struggling with 
desisting from using abusive language, a notification/alert is displayed to the 
perpetrator of the community guidelines for using the platform.
Dating app companies are aware that their location systems may be used for stalking, 
and as such they turn off location tracking by default for all users. If a person’s location 
is being continuously monitored then a system notification may request why this 
potential perpetrator is behaving in this way.
ANTICIPATING 
FORMS OF ABUSE
Simply blocking content or removing a user from a platform does not really encourage 
accountability and may even discourage the perpetrator from taking responsibility 
(Salehi, 2020). Features that explain to a user why their behaviour is harmful 
encourage perpetrators to understand harm and work to repair it, for example, by 
working to avoid the behaviour in the future or even sending an apology. However, 
contact from the perpetrator may not be appropriate for many abuse cases, so this 
should be carefully mediated and only permitted with the survivor’s consent.
ACCOUNTABILITY
users who are writing 
unacceptable messages could be 
alerted to this
when designers know about risky 
features, these should be opt-in
systems should explain to people 
their reasons for being removed 
from the system to encourage 
accountability rather than simply 
punishing
When designing to mitigate abusability, you are necessarily designing for both survivors and perpetrators. This sentence may not initially make sense, and you may be asking; why would I want to design for perpetrators? 
If we are to consider how to make their products and/or services more safe, welcoming, and empowering for survivors and how to prevent or limit abusive behaviours. While this may be complicated and challenging, it 
is worth the extra consideration both to protect marginalised users and because, as Penzey-Moog (2021) argues, designing for survivors makes products and services better for everyone (or at least, everyone who is not 
trying to cause harm). For example, taking an abusive use case into consideration leads to features like separating shared accounts that might help anyone going through other life situations, such as a break-up. In this 
section, we outline some considerations for designing for survivors and perpetrators. We look at dating apps as a case study due to their close proximity to intimate partner violence and sexual violence.
Rosie Bellini & Julia Slupska
Designing for Survivors and Perpetrators:
DATING APPS AS A CASE STUDY
SURVIVORS
PERPETRATORS
A sender could harass a receiver 
as to why they have not replied 
to their messages.
A sender could share 
intimidating or ‘coded’ 
messages through imagery.
A sender could send abusive 
texts and then rely on the 
disappearing message feature 
to remove the evidence.
An indicator that lets the sender know the receiver has 
a) received their message and/or b) read the message
A way of expanding communication for the sender 
beyond text such as emotions or reactions





An indicator that lets the sender know the receiver has 
a) received their message and/or b) read the message
A way of expanding communication for the sender 
beyond text such as emotions or reactions





users should have as much control as 
possible over how others can interact 
with them and how their information 
is shared
CONSENT
Implication Case study: dating apps
One positive example is an app that allows users to limit sharing of sensitive 
details, such as age, location, or sexual preferences. Another way an app can 
be consent-oriented is by allowing users to restrict who can contact them, for 
example to only allow ‘matches’ which the user has selected to message them.
A feature which continually shares other users' proximity (for example, disclosing they 
are 5 kilometers away) can create a lot of anxiety for someone who has experienced 
stalking or is currently in an abusive relationship, reminding them that their perpetrator 
is still nearby. If this feature exists, it should be possible and easy to turn it off.
RETRAUMATISATION
designers should consider how certain 
things can be triggering to people who 
have experienced trauma
If users are exposed to abuse, users are quickly able to smartly evidence this abuse 
and attach other offending behaviours to a blocking system that is transparent, 
encouraging and extends support beyond the original blocking request. 
When responding to complaints, platforms should try as much as possible to meet 
the needs of the person who experienced harm, for example by keeping survivors 
informed on how their complaints are addressed (i.e. will the perpetrator be 
removed from the platform, why or why not) to provide closure, rather than 
leaving them wondering whether their complaint led to anything.
RESTITUTION
approaches drawing on restorative 
justice focus on meeting the needs 
of a person who has been harmed
SUGGESTIONS FOR HOW YOU COULD PICK A FEATURE AND DO THIS YOURSELVES
Here we are designing for perpetrators, a hypothetical perpetrator who may cause damage and harm. We also should 
consider that if someone is using bad behaviours, we could consider pairing these features with notifications that 
provide support or services for abusive behaviours in the local area.
This helps to identify where the power imbalance might be, such as who is in the driving seat of these features (not 
forgetting the designers and developers who implemented them of course) and consider how such a feature could 
be used to cause harm. This is the tricky part of the exercise, but consider placing yourself in the shoes of a user 
who has just had a bad interaction with a feature and may come away feeling frustrated.
Then, identify what the initial goal of the introduction of that feature was, asking 
what did a company or provider want their users to achieve with this feature?
First things first, identify a feature. A feature is a unique aspect that allows you to do something with a system, 
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PREVENTATIVE 
ACTIONS/MESSAGING
Implication Case study: dating apps
If an abusive phrase or slur is detected in the system, it alerts the sender via a 
notification that this language is unacceptable on the dating platform. A smart 
messaging system may suggest an alternative or prevent the message from being sent. 
If an alternative is unavailable, for example, if a potential perpetrator is struggling with 
desisting from using abusive language, a notification/alert is displayed to the 
perpetrator of the community guidelines for using the platform.
Dating app companies are aware that their location systems may be used for stalking, 
and as such they turn off location tracking by default for all users. If a person’s location 
is being continuously monitored then a system notification may request why this 
potential perpetrator is behaving in this way.
ANTICIPATING 
FORMS OF ABUSE
Simply blocking content or removing a user from a platform does not really encourage 
accountability and may even discourage the perpetrator from taking responsibility 
(Salehi, 2020). Features that explain to a user why their behaviour is harmful 
encourage perpetrators to understand harm and work to repair it, for example, by 
working to avoid the behaviour in the future or even sending an apology. However, 
contact from the perpetrator may not be appropriate for many abuse cases, so this 
should be carefully mediated and only permitted with the survivor’s consent.
ACCOUNTABILITY
users who are writing 
unacceptable messages could be 
alerted to this
when designers know about risky 
features, these should be opt-in
systems should explain to people 
their reasons for being removed 
from the system to encourage 
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ABUSABILITY AND THE SECURE
SYSTEMS DEVELOPMENT LIFECYCLE
Julia Slupska
The chart below depicts the secure systems development lifecycle: the concept stage 
includes brainstorming, planning and market research. Engineers then take this concept 
and translate it into specific ‘requirements’ or features and functionality. At the design 
and development, developers implement these requirements in a model product. The 
model product is then tested for usability and other criteria, before being released. Once 
the product is on the market, maintenance involves utilisation and support for customers. 
Lastly, “end-of-life” involves disposal or recycling of the product. Although this chart 
shows a linear progression, in reality products will go through multiple iterations, for 
example returning to the design or requirements stage if testing reveals some problems.
Abusability should be incorporated at various stages of the design lifecycle. As engineers, set requirements 
(although this may also happen at the design stage), they should conduct an abuse threat modelling exercise 
asking: how might this product be abused for harm (see Slupska and Tanczer 2021, PenzeyMoog 2021)?
Abusability should be incorporated at various stages of the design lifecycle. As engineers set requirements 
(although this may also happen at the design stage), they should conduct an abuse threat modelling exercise 
asking: how might this product be abused for harm (Slupska and Tanczer, 2021; PenzeyMoog, 2021)? Once 
the product is developed, abusability tests include abuse scenarios akin to penetration testing, in which a 
malicious actor attempts to use the product for harm (Parkin et al, 2019). Results are fed back into product 
documentation or policies, or in more serious cases, the product is withdrawn or sent back for redesign. Once 
the product is on the market, the company offers a robust abuse reporting feature and support for rectification 
(see Zou et al 2020), monitoring which aspects of the product are being abused and looking for ways to mitigate 
this in the future.
Roxanne Leitao’s work (2019) involving survivors of intimate partner 
violence in anticipating harmful uses of smart home devices
IBM research (2020) on Coercive Control Resistant Design offers 
principles for designers seeking to address coercive control  
Chayn, an organisation which uses crowd sourcing to develop 
resources for survivors of domestic violence, has developed 
principles for trauma-informed design (2021)
FURTHER RESOURCES
Angelika Strohmayer, Julia Slupska, Rosanna Bellini, 
Gina Neff, Lynne Coventry, Tara Hairston, Adam Dodge




A woman was recorded for 10 years in her home by her partner without her knowledge. 
Her partner is now using 10 years of security camera footage against her to fight a custody 
battle. The partner was able to self-select footage that suited his case and omitted evidence 
of his own behaviours. The court case was broadcast live due to covid-19. The advocate 
was able to support the woman by using her organisation’s resources to help the woman 
“understand and validate her experience of coercive control, because sometimes she 
doubted her own experiences of whether she was in an abusive relationship” because the 
relationship had not been physically abusive. The advocate also encouraged her to collect 
evidence of threatening messages. “You start peeling the layers that society has, like you 
know, put on women’s minds about compromise and understanding the other person 
and they start seeing the situation for what it is. I think that is a very heavily under- under 
appreciated like services to support survivors understanding”.
In this case, as in many cases of technology abuse, supporting survivors by validating and 
helping them articulate their experience of abuse as abuse is a critical part of the support 
advocates give.
How can platforms support survivors ability to collect evidence?
How can platforms and legal systems prevent perpetrators from abusing mechanisms 
that are meant to ensure justice (like content reporting features or court cases)?
ANALYSIS
QUESTIONS FOR REFLECTION
Angelika Strohmayer, Julia Slupska, Rosanna Bellini, 
Gina Neff, Lynne Coventry, Tara Hairston, Adam Dodge




Pornhub, without seeking or getting permission, links to an advocates’ organisations’ 
Facebook page on its “Non-Consensual Content Policy” website, which results in thousands 
of people from all over the world reaching out for support with cases of image-based sexual 
abuse. The advocate spends an increasing amount of her time helping people navigate 
Pornhub and other platforms, like Facebook’s, non-consensual content policies. She said 
“the thing that’s really disheartening and upsetting, is that, you know, someone reaches out 
to me to support them. Like immediately [...] like I’m really going to be like [...] Okay let me 
just get let me just get Mark on the phone quickly and I’m like yo Zuckerberg [...] take this 
down quickly.” 
This is challenging as it often takes weeks to get non-consensual content removed, and 
then when you do get it removed, there is no support for getting evidence to prove it e.g. 
in a court of law. As a result, she said “It’s like I don’t have the funding anymore to do this 
work and I can’t stop either right? [...] And it’s not like- this isn’t my role [..] I’m not a trained 
counsellor. But like I said, people just want to hear a soothing voice and you know somewhat 
be directed to what they need to do.”
Although it is good that Pornhub at least has a page for people who experience non-
consensual content sharing, the fact that it is burdening these support services without 
compensating them for their labour is problematic. It would be better if both Pornhub 
contacted these agencies first. It would also be helpful if both Pornhub and Facebook 
offered some form of phone or email support to people experiencing abuse to help them 
with the process of takedowns. However, it is also invaluable to have independent services 
that provide emotional and technical support to survivors navigating these systems.
What kind of support should companies provide survivors of abuse on their platforms?
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RING CAMERAS AND INTIMATE 
PARTNER VIOLENCE
Case Study 3
Ring doorbell cameras are small cameras placed in peepholes which notify you via a 
smartphone or desktop app when anyone presses your doorbell. When installed by 
perpetrators or linked up to a perpetrators phone, Ring cameras can become an intrusive 
surveillance device, notifying an abuser about the survivors movements and guests to their 
home. This can isolate the survivor, as “now the perpetrator knows whenever she’s leaving 
the house” (tech abuse advocate).
However, Ring cameras can also be used by survivors to secure their home against a stalker 
or an abusive ex-partner. They can help provide the survivor with a sense of security, 
or help them collect evidence of stalking used for a court case. For this reason, some 
advocates have reached out to Ring to ask for discounted cameras for survivors. One 
advocate described these doorbell cameras as “a real way for the client to kind of take 
back her safety and like a little bit of peace of mind.”
Ring cameras pose both risks and opportunities for survivors of intimate partner violence. 
They also bring survivors into broader systems of data collection and surveillance: in 
recent years, Ring (which is owned by Amazon) has partnered with hundreds of US law 
enforcement agencies, offering departments access to its platform so that police can 
request the video recorded by homeowners’ cameras within a specific time and area 
(Harwell 2019).
Can one design a doorbell camera to be useful for survivors but not perpetrators of abuse?





A woman was recorded for 10 years in her home by her partner without 
her knowledge. Her partner is now using 10 years of security camera 
footage against her to fight a custody battle. The partner was able to 
self-select footage that suited his case and omitted evidence of his own 
behaviours. The court case was broadcast live due to covid-19. The 
advocate was able to support the woman by using her organisation’s 
resources to help the woman “understand and validate her experience of 
coercive control, because sometimes she doubted her own experiences of 
whether she was in an abusive relationship” because the relationship had 
not been physically abusive. The advocate also encouraged her to collect 
evidence of threatening messages. “You start peeling the layers that 
society has, like you know, put on women's minds about compromise and 
understanding the other person and they start seeing the situation for 
what it is. I think that is a very heavily under- under appreciated like 
services to support survivors understanding”
In this case, as in many cases of technology abuse, supporting survivors by 
validating and helping them articulate their experience of abuse as abuse is 
a critical part of the support advocates give.
ANALYSIS
QUESTIONS FOR REFLECTION
How can platforms support survivors ability to collect evidence?
How can platforms and legal systems prevent perpetrators from 
abusing mechanisms that are meant to ensure justice (like content 
reporting features or court cases)? 
COURT CASE WITH 
HIDDEN CAMERAS
Pornhub, without seeking or getting permission, links to an advocates' 
organisations' Facebook page on its "Non-Consensual Content Policy" 
website, which results in thousands of people from all over the world 
reaching out for support with cases of image-based sexual abuse. The 
advocate spends an increasing amount of her time helping people navigate 
Pornhub and other platforms, like Facebook's, non-consensual content 
policies. She said "the thing that's really disheartening and upsetting, is that, 
you know, someone reaches out to me to support them. Like immediately [...] 
like I'm really going to be like [...] Okay let me just get let me just get Mark on 
the phone quickly and I’m like yo Zuckerberg [...] take this down quickly." 
This is challenging as it often takes weeks to get non-consensual content 
removed, and then when you do get it removed, there is no support for 
getting evidence to prove it e.g. in a court of law. As a result, she said "It's like 
I don't have the funding anymore to do this work and I can't stop either right? 
[...] And it's not like- this isn't my role [..] I'm not a trained counsellor. But like 
I said, people just want to hear a soothing voice and you know somewhat be 
directed to what they need to do."
Although it is good that Pornhub at least has a page for people who 
experience non-consensual content sharing, the fact that it is burdening 
these support services without compensating them for their labour is 
problematic. It would be better if both Pornhub contacted these agencies 
first. It would also be helpful if both Pornhub and Facebook offered some 
form of phone or email support to people experiencing abuse to help them 
with the process of takedowns. However, it is also invaluable to have 
independent services that provide emotional and technical support to 
survivors navigating these systems.
ANALYSIS
QUESTIONS FOR REFLECTION
What kind of support should companies provide survivors of abuse on 
their platforms?
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Can one design a doorbell camera to be useful for survivors but not 
perpetrators of abuse?
What are the implications of partnerships like Ring’s partnership with 
police, particularly for marginalised communities?
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TAKING ABUSABILITY
SERIOUSLY
2 Company actions to address abuse incorporate principles of “trauma-informed” or “coercive control resistant” design. Tech abuse survivors and advocates are consulted at different stages of product development, their input is fairly compensated and their 
feedback is taken seriously (in contrast with level -1 where advocates are only 
consulted after product is developed).
Meaningful engagement Eg: The abuse reporting feature 
incorporates trauma-informed language 
to avoid triggering survivors. Both 
advocates and survivors were consulted 
in early stages of developing abuse 
reporting feature.
1
Company has taken action to mitigate and redress abuse on its platform or using its 
products, for example through: Including tech abuse in threat modelling or abusability 
testing; understanding how measures implemented to prevent abuse-such as reporting 
features or content moderation-can themselves be abuse; incorporating abuse into 
content moderation policies and features (such as automated detection) linked to abuse 
reporting function; offering options to survivors such as blocking perpetrators. 
Unfortunately, this level often includes “Trust and Safety” or “Responsible Innovation” 
positions without sufficient mechanisms for those teams to have enough power to 
actually shift design decisions.
Taking action
Eg: The abuse reporting feature is tied 
to measures like content moderation or 
blocking which can help defend the 
abuse survivor against further harm. 
Data from the abuse reporting feature is 
incorporated into threat modelling and 
abusability testing.
0 Key decision-makers in company demonstrate an awareness of technology abuse broadly (through reading key resources) and how technology abuse occurs in their products and platforms specifically. This includes research and active reflection on questions like:What kinds of abuse occur on our platforms, products, or devices?
Who is disproportionately affected by this kind of abuse?
How does this abuse relate to specific product features?
Organisational awareness
Eg: Platform includes an abuse reporting 
function. Aggregate data from the abuse 
reporting function are presented to and 
understood by key decision-makers.
Company either ignores the problem of technology abuse or addresses it superficially 
through: Ethics-washing: a performative display of interest in countering abuse without 
meaningful action; Tokenism: seeking approval or a “green stamp” on an already 
developed project from advocates or survivors without meaningfully consulting them.
Actively facilitating abuse-2
Thank you to Toby Shulruff at the National Network to 
End Domestic Violence for pointing out this lowest level.
Eg: No abuse reporting function 
OR a reporting function which 
is usually ignored
-1 Company designs and sells spyware or covert monitoring devices which are easily used for abuse. Willful ignorance Eg: These companies usually ignore reports that their products are used for abuse
Julia Slupska and Tara Hairston
BUILDING RESPONSIVE SYSTEMS
Although abusability is critical at the design stage (where it is preventative), it is also important to address abuse 
once it has happened. Both, the advocates who were interviewed for this project and those who attended our 
workshop, emphasized the importance of building response systems which have a relational dynamic with victim 
services: responding to problems as they arise and developing support systems for redressing cases of abuse. 
The illustration below shows the different steps organisations can take to incorporate notions of abusability 
into their product design and organisational practices. We highlight that the companies who are perhaps most 
organizationally mature, might not be the companies who are most mature in relation to their understanding of 
abusability and their treatment of abuse on their platforms.
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DO’S AND DONT’S FOR JOURNALISTS
COVERING TECHNOLOGY-MEDIATED ABUSE
Angelika Strohmayer
Do understand the differences between threats and harm: Threats are design flaws, 
weaknesses, or misuses of technology that have the potential to cause harm; whereas 
harms relate to situations where the harm has already been caused. Distinguishing the 
two can be important in understanding existing and potential threats, both of which 
must be handled carefully.
Do avoid victim blaming: for example when reporting about image based sexual abuse 
- or revenge porn - the argument should not be that the person of whom the nude 
photos were taken should not have taken the photos. Instead, the argument should be 
around consent and that the non-consensual sharing of these images and/or videos is 
unacceptable.
Do practice considerate and caring interview techniques. Go at the pace the interviewee 
is comfortable with, understand when questions become too uncomfortable to continue, 
and respect the boundaries of your interviewee. 
Do use the power you hold as journalists for good - taking a justice-oriented approach 
to your reporting.
Do not sensationalise interpersonal violence, domestic abuse, and other forms of harm 
mediated with and through technologies. The way stories are written can falsely give 
the impression that perpetrators of technology-mediated abuse are more technically 
capable than they are; reinforcing victim survivors’ feelings of subjugation
Additional resources for academics wanting to write their own articles: Public Voices 
Project (https://www.theopedproject.org/) trains researchers on how to write their 
own stories, articles, and op-eds. The Conversation (https://theconversation.com/) is an 
initiative that provides space for academics to write news stories about their research.
Additional resources for journalists: Alice Wilder’s guide to trauma-informed reporting 
contains a great deal of information about what to do, what to avoid, and how to best 
do trauma-informed reporting: https://transom.org/2021/trauma-informed-reporting/ 
and The Ground Truth project also has a fantastic guide, including 6 tips for interviewing 
people who have experienced trauma: https://thegroundtruthproject.org/interviewing-
people-experienced-trauma/
Do not repeatedly ask interviewees the same question or try to obtain highly personal 
information if this is at the risk of re-traumatising or in other ways harming the 
interviewee.

